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Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with
each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly consid-
ering the time scales of interaction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of evolution.
Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the Harmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the
disappearance of the coexistence state in the Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and
in more general situations with additional factors influencing fitness.
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Evolutionary game theory is the mathematical frame-
work for modeling evolution in biological, social, and
economical systems [1–3], and is deeply connected to
dynamical systems theory and statistical mechanics [4–
11]. In the standard setup of evolutionary game theory,
strategies available for the game are represented by a
fraction of individuals in the population. Individuals then
interact according to the rules of the game, and the so
earned payoffs determine the frequencies of the next gen-
eration (i.e., payoffs represent reproductive fitness).
Customarily, most evolutionary game studies make the
additional assumption that individuals play many times
and with all other players before reproduction takes place,
so that payoffs, equivalently fitness, are given by the mean
distribution of types in the population. This is also the
situation for the so-called round-robin tournament, in
which each individual plays once with every other. Both
hypotheses, common in biological evolution, imply that
selection occurs much more slowly than the interaction
between individuals. Although recent experimental studies
show that this may not always be the case in biology [12–
14], it is clear that in cultural evolution or social learning
the time scale of selection is much closer to the time scale
of interaction. The effects of this mixing of scales cannot
be disregarded [15], and then it is natural to ask about the
consequences of the above assumption and the effect of
relaxing it. Though the main field of application of our
work is social and cultural evolution, we maintain the usual
language of evolutionary biology, to avoid introducing new
terminology.
In this Letter, we show that rapid selection affects evolu-
tionary dynamics in such a dramatic way that for some
games it even changes the stability of equilibria. In order to
make explicit the relation between selection and interac-
tion time scales, we use discrete-time dynamics. We follow
Moran dynamics [16], as this is the proper way to describe
evolution of discrete generations in the field of population
dynamics [17]. Specifically, we choose the frequency-
dependent version of the Moran dynamics introduced by
[18], which allows to consider an evolutionary game in this
dynamical context: N individuals interact by playing a
game and reproduce by selecting one individual, with
probability proportional to the payoff, to duplicate and
substitute a randomly chosen individual. The payoff of
every player is set to zero after each reproduction event,
and this two-step cycle is repeated until the population
eventually stabilizes. This stochastic dynamics is discrete
in both population and time, while keeping the population
size constant over time. Interestingly, this microscopic
dynamics leads to a difference equation that has been
proposed as an adjusted [1] or discrete-time [2] analogous
of the replicator equation, widely used in evolutionary
game theory (see [9] for a recent, detailed discussion of
this issue). Additionally, we note that for social applica-
tions, reproduction may be also interpreted as a learning
process, in which individuals do not die but instead change
the way they behave or their strategies.
Time scales enter the dynamics through the interaction
step, affecting the way fitness is obtained. We introduce a
new interaction scheme, by allowing an integer number s
of randomly chosen pairs of individuals to play consec-
utively the game, between reproduction events. Thus, s
equals the ratio between selection and interaction time
scales. This is the crucial parameter in our model. The
limit value of s  1 means that both time scales are equal;
greater finite values, s > 1, correspond to the selection
time scale being slower than the interaction time scale,
and the limit value of s ! 1 recovers the round-robin
procedure. In fact, the equivalence of the limit s ! 1 to
the round-robin scheme points to the latter being a form of
‘‘mean-field’’ theory, in which individuals reproduce so
slowly that it makes sense to replace pairwise interactions
by the interaction with the ‘‘average player’’.
As for the games, we will consider the important case of
symmetric 2 2 games, in which the payoffs are given by
the following matrix
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whose rows give the payoff obtained by each strategy when
confronted with the other or itself, and a, b, c, d > 0. Let n
be the number of individuals using strategy 1, also referred
as type 1 individuals. After each reproduction event n may
stay the same, increase by one, or decrease by one. The
corresponding transition probabilities will depend on the
fitness earned by each type during the interaction step and
on their frequencies. As both quantities will depend ulti-
mately on n, we have a Markov process with a tridiagonal
transition matrix (i.e., a birth-death process [19]) whose
nonzero coefficients are
 Pn;n1  nN E

F2
F1  F2 jn

; Pn;n1  N  nN E

F1
F1  F2 jn

; (2)
and Pn;n  1 Pn;n1  Pn;n1. Fi is the payoff obtained by all players of type i, and Ejn denotes the expected value
conditioned to a population of n individuals of type 1.
We stress that the parameter s enters through the expected values of the relative fitness of each type (2). Indeed, if we
restrict ourselves to the limit s ! 1, these expected values are given directly by the pairing probabilities and the payoffs
corresponding to each pair
 E

F1
F1  F2 jn

 nn 1a nN  nb
nn 1a nN  nb c  N  nN  n 1d (3)
as would be obtained by the round-robin scheme. However,
as we will see below, finite values of s often lead to results
completely different from this special case.
The solution to the birth-death process can be obtained
in a standard manner [19]. Denoting by pn the fixation
probability of type 1 (i.e., the probability of ending up in a
population with all individuals of type 1) when starting
from a population with n players of this type, we have
 pn  Pn;n1pn1  Pn;npn  Pn;n1pn1; (4)
with p0  0 and pN  1. The solution to this equation is
given by
 pnQn=QN; Qn1
Xn1
j1
Yj
i1
Pi;i1
Pi;i1
; n>1; (5)
with Q1  1. As stated above, the interesting case arises
for finite values of the parameter s. For general s, a
straightforward combinatorial analysis of all the possible
sequences of s pairings leads to
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This lengthy combinatorial expression reduces, in the limit
case s  1 of extremely rapid selection, to
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The above equations are the first hint of the effect of time
scales. For this extreme case, only the coefficients of the
skew diagonal of (1) appear in (7). Therefore, if the time
scale of selection equals that of interaction, the evolution-
ary outcome of any game will be determined solely by the
performance of each strategy when confronted with the
other, and independently of the results when dealing with
itself. However, as we will now see, there are another
nontrivial, important differences.
To make our study as general as possible, we have
analyzed all 12 nonequivalent symmetric 2 2 games
[20]. These games can be further classified into three
categories, according to their Nash equilibria and their
dynamical behavior under the replicator dynamics with
round-robin interaction:
(i) There are six games with a > c and b > d, or a < c
and b < d. They have a unique Nash equilibrium, cor-
responding to the dominant pure strategy. This equilibrium
is the global attractor of the round-robin replicator
dynamics.
(ii) There are three games with a > c and b < d. They
have several Nash equilibria, one of them with a mixed
strategy. With the round-robin replicator dynamics, this
mixed strategy equilibrium is an unstable point, which
acts as the boundary between the basins of attraction of
the two pure strategies, which are the attractors.
(iii) The remaining three games have a < c and b > d.
They have several Nash equilibria, one of them with a
mixed strategy. This mixed strategy equilibrium is the
global attractor of the round-robin replicator dynamics.
The two pure strategies are unstable in this case.
Let us first consider an example of class (i), namely, the
Harmony game [21] (a  1, b  0:25, c  0:75, d 
0:01). This is a no-conflict game, in which all players
obtain the maximum payoff by following strategy 1. As
Fig. 1(a) shows, this is the result for large values of s, with
a fixation probability pn 	 1 for almost all n. On the other
hand, Fig. 1(a) also shows that, for small s, strategy 2, i.e.,
the inefficient (in the sense of lowest payoff) one, is
selected by the dynamics, unless starting from initial con-
ditions with almost all individuals of type 1.
For class (ii), a good paradigm is the Stag-Hunt game
[22] (a  1, b  0:01, c  0:8, d  0:2), which is a co-
ordination game: Strategy 1 maximizes the mutual benefit,
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whereas strategy 2 minimizes the risk of loss, and the
conflict results from having to choose between these two
options. As Fig. 1(b) reveals, the round-robin result is
obtained for large s: both strategies are attractors, with
the basin boundary located at the frequency corresponding
to the mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e., x  d b=a
c d b 	 0:49. However, for small values of s this
boundary shifts to greater frequency values, thus reflecting
an advantage of strategy 2. In the extreme s  1 case this
strategy becomes the unique attractor.
It is interesting to note that Fig. 1 shows that there is not
a general crossover at s 	 N. In the Harmony game, the
round-robin regime is mostly reached for s ’ 10 
 N,
whereas in the Stag-Hunt game this does not happen until
s ’ 100  N.
Finally, let us consider the Snowdrift game [23] (a  1,
b  0:2, c  1:8, d  0:01) as an example of class (iii).
This is also a dilemma game, as each player has to choose
between strategy 1, which maximizes the population gain,
and strategy 2, which gives individuals the maximum pay-
off by exploiting the opponent. With round-robin dynamics
both strategies coexists in the long run, with frequencies
corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium. However,
our dynamics can never maintain coexistence indefinitely,
because by construction one of the absorbing states (all
players of type 1 or all of type 2) will be reached sooner or
later with probability 1. Nonetheless, it is possible to study
the duration of metastable states by using the mean time in
each population state before absorbtion, tn [19]. Figure 2
shows the results for two values of s and a broad range of
initial conditions. For s large (s  100), the population
stays for a long time near the value corresponding to the
mixed strategy equilibrium x  d b=a c d
b 	 0:19, independently of the initial number of type 1
individuals. A smaller value of s  10 (not shown) induces
a shift of the metastable equilibrium to smaller values of n,
again almost independently of the initial conditions.
Finally, for an even smaller value of s (s  5), there is
no metastable equilibrium, but a fluctuation towards the
x  0 absorbing state, which clearly depends on the initial
conditions.
Having given examples of all three classes, we will
summarize the rest of our study by saying that the remain-
ing 2 2 games behave in a similar way, with rapid
selection (small s) favoring in all cases the type that has
the greatest coefficient in the skew diagonal of the payoff
matrix. For the remaining five games of class (i) this results
in a reinforcement of the dominant strategy (the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [24] being a prominent example). The other two
games of class (ii) exhibit once again a displacement of the
basins of attraction, whereas the other two class (iii) games
display the suppression of the coexistence state in favor of
one of the strategies. We thus see that rapid selection leads
very generally to outcomes entirely different from those of
round-robin dynamics.
It is important to realize that our results do not change
qualitatively with the system size. Considering for instance
the Stag-Hunt game, the change in the basins of attraction
is practically independent of the population size. The main
effect of working with larger sizes is a steeper transition
between the basins of attraction. Indeed, due to the inherent
stochasticity of finite population sizes, smaller populations
have a more blurred basin boundary, with points in each
basin having an increasing nonzero probability of reaching
the other basin [25]. Our results for all other symmetric
2 2 games are equally robust. In fact, for very rapid
selection, s  1, the limit N ! 1 of the transition proba-
bilities, Eq. (7), shows that they depend only on the fre-
quencies of both types.
It could be argued that in our model only s pairs of
individuals play in each round, resulting in a very small
effective population, this being the fundamental cause of
the reported results. To probe into this issue, we have
introduced a background of fitness [7,18], so that every
player has an intrinsic probability of being selected, re-
gardless of the outcome of the game, and thus guaranteeing
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FIG. 2 (color online). Mean time before fixation in the
Snowdrift game for s  5 (a) and 100 (b). Initial values of n
equal to 20 (), 50 (4), and 80 (+). Curves in (b) overlap.
Population size N  100.
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FIG. 1 (color online). Fixation probabilities in the games
(a) Harmony and (b) Stag-Hunt for s  1 (), 5 (), 10 (4),
100 (+), or ! 1 (). In (a), curves overlap for s  10, 100, and
! 1. Population size N  100.
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a population of N players. Indeed, in most applications,
agents interact through more than one type of game and
there are external contributions to fitness (environmental
factors, fashions, or media influence in a social context,
etc.). Let fb be the normalized fitness background, so that
each individual has a background of fitness sfb=N before
selection takes place; fb  1 means that the overall fitness
coming from the game and from the background are ap-
proximately equal, for every value of s and N. Figure 3
shows the results for the Stag-Hunt game. A small fitness
background of fb  0:1 gives fixation probabilities very
similar to those with fb  0 [Fig. 2(b)]. For larger values,
fb  1, the displacement of the basin boundary is smaller,
but still perfectly noticeable. And a very large fitness
background, fb * 10 (not shown), drives the dynamics to
random selection for every value of s, because in this case
the influence of the game is almost negligible. Again, for
the remaining symmetric 2 2 games, our conclusions
remain valid as well in the presence of a background of
fitness. Consequently, our results are not merely due to a
finite size effect of a small effective population of players.
In summary, we have proven that considering indepen-
dent interaction and selection time scales leads to highly
nontrivial, counterintuitive results. We have demonstrated
the generality of this conclusion by considering all sym-
metric 2 2 games and showing that rapid selection may
lead to changes of the asymptotically selected equilibria, to
changes of the basins of attraction of equilibria, or to
suppression of long-lived metastable equilibria. This result
has major implications for applying evolutionary game
theory to model a specific problem, as the assumption of
slow selection and consequently of round-robin dynamics
may or may not be correct. Indeed, as the example in [15]
shows, rapid selection may lead to the understanding of
problems where Darwinian, individual evolution was
thought not to play a role because round-robin dynamics
was used. We envisage that successful modeling in rapidly
changing environments, such as social or (sub-)culture
dynamics, will need a careful consideration of the involved
time scales along the lines discussed here.
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FIG. 3 (color online). Fixation probability in the Stag-Hunt
game with a background of fitness fb  0:1 (a) and 1 (b). Values
of s: 5 (), 10 (4), 100 (+). Population size N  100.
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